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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2- 2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded appellants' that the lis pendens 
filed by defendant cannot form the basis of an abuse of process claim as a matter of law. 
(Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's 
conclusion is reviewed for correctness since it was reached on cross motions for 
summary judgment. Arnold Indus., Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133, f 11, 63 P.3d 721. 
2. Was the trial court wrong in concluding that the affidavit testimony of Richard 
Vincent failed to establish an ulterior motive or a willful act not proper in the regular 
course of proceedings? (Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-
270.) The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that testimony from a lender or title 
company on the impact of the lis pendens was necessary to appellant's abuse of process 
claim?(Issue preserved R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial 
court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus., Inc., v. 
Love, 2002 UT 133, \\ 1, 63 P.3d 721. 
4. Did the trial court incorrectly conclude that the underlying lawsuit and lis 
pendens cannot form the basis of a tortious interference claim because both are privileged 
as a matter of law? (Issue preserved at R. at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) 
1 
The trial court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus, 
Inc., v. Love, 2002 UT 133, \\ 1, 63 P.3d 721. 
5. Was the trial court wrong in concluding the facts appellant offered in supoort of 
its interference claim are insufficient as a matter of law. (Issue preserved R. at 439-440, 
R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's conclusions that the facts failed to 
meet the legal standard is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (UT 1997). 
6. Did the trial court err when it used Mountain West's failure to meet discovery 
deadlines as a basis for granting HCU's summary judgment motion? (Issue preserved R. 
at 439-440, R. at 384-392, and R. at 252-270.) The trial court's summary judgment 
rulings are reviewed for correctness. Arnold Indus., Inc., v Love, 2002 UT 133, ^ [11, 63 
P.3d721. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order granting appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denying the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiffs and appellants 
Mountain West Surgical Center LLC and Mountainwest Medical Properties LLC. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On January 7, 2004, Mountain West Surgical Center and Mountainwest Medical 
Properties, LLC, (sometimes collectively referred to as "Mountain West" and other times 
individually referred to as "Mountain West Surgical" and "Mountainwest Properties") 
filed this lawsuit against Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview Hospital ("HCU"). 
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(R. at 1-7.) HCU responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss on March 24, 2004. (R. at 11-
13.) The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss by order dated June 11, 2004 (R. 54-
55.) HCU then filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with this 
Court. (R. at 56-174.) By order dated July 19, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals denied 
the petition (R. at 182-184.) After Mountain West filed an Amended Complaint on 
August 3, 2004, HCU filed an answer to the Amended Complaint on August 20, 2004. 
(R. at 185-194 and 195-205.) 
HCU filed a motion for summary judgment on Mountain West's abuse of process, 
anti-trust1 and intentional interference with economic relations claims (R. at 249-251.) 
Mountain West opposed that motion and filed its own motion for partial summary 
judgment, seeking partial summary judgment on the abuse of process claim (R. at 252-
308, 439-440.) Mountain West's motion was supported in part by the affidavits of 
Richard Vincent and George Bennett. (R. at 407-438 and 413-416.) HCU opposed 
Mountain West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, moved to strike the Affidavit of 
Richard Vincent (R. at 462-482, 488-493) and filed a motion for Rule 56(f) relief. (R. at 
479-480.) In conjunction with these motions, Mountain West also moved to amend the 
scheduling order to allow additional time to conduct limited discovery. (R. at 444-445.) 
Following a hearing, the trial court granted HCU's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, denied Mountain West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, denied 
Mountain West's Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and denied HCU's Motion to 
1
 Mountain West voluntarily dismissed their anti-trust claim. (R. at 450-451 and 460-
461.) 
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Strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent. (R. at 338-339.) A copy of the Court's Order is 
included in the Addendum as Tab A2. Mountain West timely filed a notice of appeal. (R. 
at 519-520.) 
III. Statement of Facts 
In 1999, Mountainwest Properties organized a joint venture with Mountain West 
Surgical and South Davis Community Hospital O'SDCH") for the construction and 
operation of a 47,000 square foot medical office building (wtthe Medical Center'') on 
property owned by SDCH adjacent to Lakeview Hospital. (R. at. 408.) The parties 
planned to lease 6,000 of the planned 47,000 square feet to Mountain West Surgical for a 
surgical center (the "Surgical Center"). (R. at 408.) The remaining space in the Medical 
Center was to be leased as office space to doctors who were members of Mountainwest 
Properties. (R. at 408.) 
Under the planned joint venture, SDCH was to contribute a portion of its property 
to Mountainwest Properties in exchange for a membership interest in the company. (R. at 
383 and 408.) SDCH did not have, and was never going to have, a membership interest 
in Mountain West Surgical. (R. at 383 and R. at 408.) 
Throughout 1999, Mountainwest Properties worked towards the construction of 
the Medical Center. (R. at 383 and R. at 408.) It obtained building approval from 
Bountiful City to construct the Medical Center, paid architects and engineers hundreds of 
2
 The trial court's record transferred to the Supreme Court did not include a copy of the 
final Order. Through separate motion, the parties are jointly moving the Court to 
supplement the Record to include the Order. A copy of the order is attached in the 
Addendum as Tab A. 
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thousands of dollars to prepare final plans and specifications, and received commitments 
for construction financing and long term financing for the Medical Center. (R. at 383 and 
R. at 409.) At the same time, HCU actively opposed construction of the Medical Center. 
(R. at 383 and R. at 409.) For example, it openly opposed Mountainwest Properties' 
efforts to obtain development approval from Bountiful City. (R. at 383 and R. at 409.) 
When Mountainwest Properties obtained development approvals despite HCU's 
administrative efforts, HCU turned to the courts and filed a complaint against SDCH on 
January 10, 2000 (the w;Lawsuit"). (R. at 384.) HCU alleged four separate causes of 
action against SDCH: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Restrictive Covenant on the Use of Land; and (4) 
Declaratory Judgment. (R. at 384.) None of HCU's claims related to the type of 
structure that could be built on SDCH's property. (R. at 384.) In addition, none of the 
claims related to title or right to possession of the property. Rather, all claims related in 
one way or another to an alleged restriction on the activities that could take place in that 
structure. (R. at 384.) 
By March of 2000, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment 
from its construction lender, and intended to begin construction on the Medical Center 
during the first week of March. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.) SDCH was prepared to 
convey the property into Mountainwest Properties and construction was about to begin on 
the Medical Center when HCU filed a document entitled "Notice of Lis Pendens" in the 
office of the Davis County Recorder on March 2, 2000 (the "Lis Pendens'^). (R. at 504-
508) (A copy is of the Lis Pendens is included in the Addendum as Tab B.) The Lis 
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Pendens was recorded in spite of the fact that HCU had no claims impacting title or right 
to possession of the property. The Lis Pendens was discovered by Mountainwest 
Properties when its lender pulled a final title report as it was preparing to fund 
Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.) 
It soon became clear that HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with 
construction of the Medical Center. Following the filing of the Lawsuit and recording of 
the Lis Pendens, Richard Vincent, a board member of Mountainwest Medical and 
Mountain West Surgical had a conversation with Lynn Summerhays, a member of 
Lakeview Hospital's board. (R. at 385-386 and R. at 410.) Mr. Summerhays informed 
Mr. Vincent that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were just the first in a series of actions that 
HCU intended to take to stop construction of the Medical Center. He told Mr. Vincent 
that HCU would do whatever was necessary tie up the process and delay construction of 
the Medical Center at the SDCH location. (R. at 385-386 and R. at 410.) A copy of the 
Affidavit of PLichard Vincent is included in the Addendum as Tab C. 
On June 28, 2001, the Court in the underlying Lawsuit dismissed three of HCU's 
four claims on summary judgment. (R. at 386.) It also ruled that the Lis Pendens was a 
wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1(6). Specifically, the Court 
found that the Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien because it was not authorized by statute. 
The plain wording of Utah Code Annotated §§78-40-1 and 2 requires that the 
action has to affect title to and /or the right to possession of land. HCU has not 
alleged any right to title to any of the parcels described in their lis pendens. 
Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these said parcels. 
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(R. at 394-404.) A copy of Judge Allphin's Ruling is included in the Addendum as Tab 
oL After the joint venture deteriorated, HCU settled the remaining claim in the lawsuit 
by paying SDCH an undisclosed sum. 
The Lawsuit and notice of Lis Pendens served their purpose, and effectively 
stopped the project. The lender withdrew its commitment for construction financing and 
SDCH withdrew from the joint venture and did not convey the property to Mountainwest 
Properties. (R. at 384 and R. at 409.) Mountainwest Properties ultimately built the 
Medical Center at an alternate location after substantial delays and after incurring 
significant additional costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE LIS 
PENDENS FILED BY HCU CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR AN ABUSE OF 
PROCESS CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding Mountain West's 
abuse of process claim. Mountain West argued that HCU's filing of the lis pendens was 
an abuse of process of as a matter of law. HCU argued that Mountain West could not 
factually prove the elements of an abuse process claim. After oral argument, the trial 
court concluded that the Lis Pendens cannot form the basis of an abuse of process claim, 
granted HCU's motion and denied Mountain West's motion. 
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A, Factual Basis for Mountain West's Abuse of Process Claim 
The material facts before the trial court were largely undisputed. Two months 
after HCU filed the Lawsuit, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment 
from its construction lender, SDCH was prepared to convey its property to the joint 
venture and Mountainwest Properteies and was prepared to begin construction. Then 
HCU filed a Lis Pendens that it admits was not supported by a claim to title or 
possession. The Lis Pendens effectively stopped everything. The lender discovered the 
Lis Pendens and withdrew its commitment for construction financing and SDCH 
withdrew its commitment to convey the property. 
Any remaining hope was killed when Lynn Summerhays, a member of Lakeview 
Hospital's board told Richard Vincent that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were just the first 
in a series of actions that HCU intended to take to stop construction of the Medical 
Center. Mr. Summerhays stated that HCU would do whatever was necessary tie up the 
process and delay construction of the Medical Center at the SDCH location. 
B. Argument 
In Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P. 3d 323, this Court 
explained that to establish a claim for abuse of process, 
a claimant must demonstrate first, an ulterior motive [and] second, an act in 
the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings. Unlike a plaintiff asserting a claim for wrongful use of civil 
proceedings, a plaintiff in an abuse of process claim is not required to 
establish that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor or that the 
proceeding lacked probable cause. 
Id. at f 37 (emphasis added). 
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In other words, abuse of process wiis not the wrongful procurement of legal process 
or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no 
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to 
accomplish." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682 cmt. a. 
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, this Court must concluded that the 
recording of the Lis Pendens violated the two part test found in Anderson Development. 
1. Improper Use of Process 
In Hatch v. Davis, 24 Ut. App. 378, 102 P.3d 744 the Utah Court of Appeals 
explained that to establish an improper use of the process, a litigant must establish: 
[sjome act or threat directed to an immediate objective not legitimate in the use of 
the process; In re Terracor, No. 81-00599, 1982 Bankr.LEXIS 3251, at 19 
(Bankr.N.D. Utah Sept. 27, 1982)(noting that the test for abuse of process is "that 
there must be 4a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceeding' or 'some definite act not authorized by the 
process'") (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts, § 121, at 857-858). 
Id at \ 14. (emphasis added) 
It is undisputed that HCU's use of the Lis Pendens was not proper in the regular 
prosecution of a proceeding, and that the Lis Pendens was not authorized by the process 
in the underlying Lawsuit. This conclusion is supported by the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-40-2, Utah case law, the language of the Lis Pendens itself, and Judge 
Allphin's ruling. 
Utah law is clear that the filing of a lis pendens is a legal process that is only 
proper in certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 provides: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right to possession of real 
property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and 
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the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is 
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with 
the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is 
situated a notice of the pendancy of the action... 
Simply put, a party may only encumber another's property with a lis pendens if it has 
filed claims in a lawsuit that impact title to, or right to possession of, real property. In 
fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that if an attorney records a lis pendens, when 
the underlying claims do not impact title or right to possession, that lis pendens is 
groundless as a matter of law. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. App 
1999). 
HCU's claims in the Lawsuit had no bearing on the title to, or possession of, 
SDCH's property. Rather, all of HCU's claims related to alleged restrictions on the type 
of business that could be conducted within the Medical Center. Under those 
circumstances, HCU violated section 78-40-2 when it recorded the Lis Pendens. 
The text of the Lis Pendens confirms that HCU intended to misuse the process. 
Obviously aware of the requirements of section 78-40-2, HCU did not even claim a right 
to title or possession. Instead, it filed a Lis Pendens that read: 
To whom it may concern, please take notice: Hospital Corporation of Utah, 
dba Lakeview Hospital ("Lakeview"), the above-named plaintiff, has a 
pending Complaint against the above-named defendant South Davis 
Community Hospital, Inc. ("South Davis") in the above-entitled Court for 
injunctive relief against South Davis' proposed use of certain real property 
owned by South Davis... 
(R. at 504-507.) 
On its face, the Lis Pendens is not even an attempt to comply with section 
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78-40-2. Therefore, there can be no reasonable argument that the Lis Pendens was filed 
for its proper purpose: to notify third parties that a claim existed affecting title to or 
possession of the property. By statute, any other purpose is improper. 
Finally, the conclusion that the Lis Pendens was a misuse of the process is 
confirmed by Judge Allphin's Ruling. As he explained, "[t]he plain wording of Utah 
Code Annotated §§78-40-1 and 2 requires that the action has to affect title to and/or the 
right to possession of land. HCU has not alleged any right to title to any of the parcels 
described in their lis pendens. Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these 
said parcels." Furthermore, "even if HCU had a legitimate property interest, it failed to 
adequately describe in its Complaint both this interest and the particular parcels for which 
it had such an interest. Therefore, the Court finds that HCU's Notice of Lis Pendens was 
improperly filed and thus is a wrongful lien." (R. at 403.) 
2. Ulterior Motive 
There can be no reasonable dispute regarding HCU's motive in filing the Lis 
Pendens. This Court has consistently held that "the sole purpose of recording a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings which may be 
derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 
590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
It was undisputed that HCU had no claim to title or right to possession. 
Therefore, it had no legitimate interest to protect by recording the Lis Pendens. If the 
only proper motive for recording the Lis Pendens was not available to HCU, then its 
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decision to record the Lis Pendens must have been born of an ulterior motive. Time and 
again HCU has admitted that motive: to stop construction of the project. (R at 468.) 
The timing of the Lis Pendens helps illustrate HCU's ulterior motive. HCU filed 
its Complaint on January 10, 2000. It did not, however, immediately record the Lis 
Pendens. Rather, it waited until March 2, 2000, days before SDCH was to convey the 
property to Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties was scheduled to 
close on its construction financing. Combined with the statements of HCU board 
member Lynn Summerhays, it is clear that the Lis Pendens was a tactical attempt to use 
the process to disrupt Mountainwest Properties' financing and stop construction. 
While Utah courts have not directly addressed the misuse of a lis pendens as the 
basis for an abuse of process claim, this issue has been addressed by courts in other 
jurisdictions. For example, in Saltsrom v. Starke, 670 P.2d 809, (Co. Ct. App. 1983) the 
court held that a lis pendens filed to prevent a sale to a third party, when the filing party 
knew it did not have a valid purchase contract, could serve as the basis for an abuse of 
process claim. Id at 811. Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Broadmoor 
Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 413 S.E.2d 9, (S.C. 1992) held that by filing an 
improper lis pendens, there was "ample evidence from which a jury could infer 
that.. .Horwitz willfully abused the process, with the ulterior purpose of preventing a sale 
to third parties in hopes of obtaining financial backing with which to purchase the 
property at an advantageous price." 
Based on the foregoing, Mountain West established the ulterior motive 
component. 
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II. THE TRIAL ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE IN FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE OR A 
WILLFUL ACT. 
The evidence before the trail court regarding HCU's ulterior motive was 
undisputed. HCU admitted that it had no claim that impacted title or right to possession, 
and that it recorded a Lis Pendens anyway. (R at 466.) HCU admitted that it motive was 
to stop construction of the project, a goal it could not accomplish through its claims in the 
lawsuit. HCU's board member, Lynn Summerhays, stated that the Lawsuit and Lis 
Pendens were just the first in a series of actions that HCU intended to take to stop 
construction of the project. (R at 410.) 
On the other hand, HCU presented no evidence of any kind regarding its motive. 
Consequently, the only conclusion the trial court could reach was that HCU had an 
ulterior motive. This is particularly true, in light of the fact that when reviewing a trial 
court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts and "all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT, 24, Tf2, 116 P.3d 263. 
Similar problems exist with the trial court's finding that Mountain West failed to 
produce evidence of a willful act not proper in the regular course of proceedings. It is 
undisputed that HCU had no claims impacting title to or right to possession. This fact 
was confirmed by the court in the underlying Lawsuit when it deemed the Lis Pendens a 
wrongful lien. (R at 403.) There has never been an argument regarding the willfulness of 
HCU's actions. Consequently, the only competent evidence before the trial court was 
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that HCU willfully recorded a lis pendens that was not proper in the regular course of a 
proceeding. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TESTIMONY 
FROM A LENDER OR TITLE COMPANY ON THE IMPACT OF THE LIS 
PENDENS WAS NECESSARY. 
On a related issue the trial court found that "Plaintiffs offer no testimony from any 
lender or title company that the lis pendens, as such, caused them to refuse to proceed 
with the sale of the underlying land." (See Addendum, Tab A.) This finding is troubling 
for three reasons. First, it misstates the nature of the transaction; second, it implies that 
testimony from a lender or title company is necessary to support Mountain West's 
claims; third, it ignores the undisputed testimony from Richard Vincent and George 
Bennet that confirmed this fact. 
Mountain West established through the affidavit of Richard Vincent that "the lis 
pendens was discovered by Mountainwest Properties when its lender pulled a final title 
report as it was preparing to fund Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. The 
notice of lis pendens effectively stopped the project. SDCH did not deed the property to 
Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties' lender withdrew its commitment 
for construction financing." (R. at 409) This testimony was confirmed by the testimony 
of George Bennett, president of SDCH. (R. at 416.) HCU did not dispute this testimony, 
and the trial court denied its motion to strike the testimony. 
Based on the foregoing, there was competent, undisputed evidence that the lis 
pendens disrupted Mountainwest Property's construction financing. Any conclusion to 
the contrary is not supported by the record, and the trial court erred in its findings. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT AND LIS PENDENS CANNOT FORM THE BASIS 
OF A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BECAUSE BOTH ARE PROTECTED BY THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
PRIVILEGE. 
The trial court concluded that the filing of the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were 
privileged as a matter of law and therefore could not form the basis of a tortious 
interference claim. (See Order attached in the Addendum as Tab A.) HCU first made 
this argument in a motion to dismiss that was denied by the trial court. HCU then 
petitioned this Court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal on this issue. That 
petition was denied. (R. at 182-184.) HCU's motion for summary judgment was its third 
attempt to argue this issue. (R. at 249-251.) Its rationale for revisiting this issue a third 
time was its claim that the law in Utah been clarified by the Court's decision in Anderson 
Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P. 3d 323. 
The claim is wrong. Utah courts have consistently held that baseless and 
unfounded litigation can serve as the basis for an interference with economic 
relationships claim. 
The seminal Utah case addressing the tort of interference with economic relations 
is Leigh Furniture v. Isorn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Much like this case, Leigh 
Furniture is a case based on the filing of groundless lawsuits. In that case, Isom brought 
a counterclaim against the Leigh Corporation for intentional interference with contractual 
relations based on, among other things, groundless lawsuits filed by the Leigh 
Corporation. While setting forth the elements of a tortious interference claim, this Court 
explained that '^unfounded litigation" satisfies the improper means component of a 
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tortious interference claim. Id. at 308-09. In the process, the Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the judicial proceedings privilege and first amendment concerns. 
In St. Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 
(Utah 1994), the Court confirmed that "unfounded litigation" can serve as improper 
means. Id at 201. Since then, the Court has never indicated any intention to limit its 
holdings in Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development in the manner advocated by 
HCU. 
Furthermore, the Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development decisions are 
consistent with the great weight of authority on this issue. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 767 comment c, for example, states: 
Litigation and the threat of litigation are powerful weapons. When 
wrongfully instituted, litigation entails harmful consequences to... the 
actor's adversaries. The use of these weapons.. .is ordinarily wrongful if 
the actor has no belief in the merit of the litigation or if, though having 
some belief in its merits, he nevertheless institutes or threatens to institute 
the action in bad faith, intending only to harass the third parties and not to 
bring his claim to definitive adjudication. 
Applying § 767, the court in National Assoc. Professional Basketball Leagues v. Very 
Minor Leagues, 223 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000), explained that wrongful litigation can 
serve as the basis for a tortious interference claim. Authority from other jurisdictions is 
in accord.3 
3
 See Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598 (3rd. Cir. 1990); Trau-Med v. Allstate Ins., 71 
S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002); Guard-Life v. S. Parker Hardware, 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 
1980); Corning Inc. v. SRUBiosystems, 292 F.Supp. 2d 583 (D. Del. 2003); Cacique, 
Inc. v. Gonzalez,WL 609278 (N.D. 111. 2004); Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2003); Matsushita Electronics Corp. v. Loral Co., 91A F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co,, 797 F.2d 70 (2d. Cir. 1986). 
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In the face of well settled Utah law, HCU relied on the decision in Anderson 
Development to support is argument that the underlying Lawsuit and Lis Pendens cannot 
form the basis for a tortious interference claim, and are privileged as a matter of law. 
While the trial court agreed with HCU's position, a careful review of the holding in 
Anderson Development establishes that it is not controlling on this case. 
Unlike the claims in this case, the tort claims in Anderson Development were not 
based on the filing of a lawsuit. Instead, they were based on statements made by Tobias 
during a public hearing in which he opposed Anderson Development's zoning 
application. In addressing whether those statements could satisfy the improper means 
component of an interference claim, the Court acknowledged, as it did in Leigh 
Furniture, that certain speech is protected by the First Amendment. Relying on Searle v. 
Johnson, the Court explained that the First Amendment protects "political activity against 
tort claims as well as antitrust claims". Anderson Development at 332, citing Searle v. 
Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982). The Court found that because petitioning the city 
constituted political activity, Tobias's statements were protected by the First Amendment. 
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the Court indicate that its holding impact the 
numerous tort claims, including tortious interference, abuse of process and wrongful use 
of civil proceedings, that can be based on the filing of lawsuits. Furthermore, nowhere in 
the opinion does the Court indicate that it intends to overturn or limit Leigh Furniture and 
St. Benedict Development4 
4
 In fact, the Court's opinion in Anderson Development relies on the holding in Sear I v. 
Johnson. The rationale in Searl v. Johnson cannot be read to overturn Leigh Furniture 
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In addition to its reliance on Anderson Development, HCU relied on language 
from Bennett v Jones Waldo, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003), to support its argument that the 
Court has somehow created a blanket privilege for "use of the legal process itself." The 
Court did nothing of the sort, and did not even attempt to address the long-standing Utah 
law established by the Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture. Instead, the Bennett Court 
simply held that statements made during prior bar order litigation could not serve as the 
basis for subsequent intentional infliction of emotional distress and deceit claims. This is 
consistent with the Court's previous application of the privilege to defamation claims 
based on statements made in demand letters or statements made during the litigation 
process. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN CONCLUDING THE FACT 
APPELANTS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF ITS INTERFERENCE CLAIM ARE 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Mountain West contends that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens satisfy the improper 
means component of a tortious interference claim. Mountain West supported its claims 
with proof that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens were groundless. Despite the fact that 
Mountain West's evidence was undisputed, the trial court ruled that Mountain West 
"failed to factually demonstrate the elements of an interference claim." {See Order 
included in Tab A of the Addendum.) 
since the opinion in Searl v Johnson actually predates Leigh Furniture. The Noerr-
Penningon doctrine and the Court's ruling in Leigh Furniture have existed in harmony 
since 1986. 
18 
The law in Utah is well established that to prevail on a claim for tortious 
interference, a plaintiff must demonstrate, "(I).. .the defendant intentionally interfered 
with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to plaintiffs." Anderson Development, citing 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). There was no real 
dispute before the trial court regarding the first and third elements of the interference 
claim. It was undisputed that HCU interfered with Mountain West's economic relations 
and it was undisputed that Mountain West was injured. The only issue before the trial 
court was whether HCU interfered for an improper purpose or by an improper means. 
As is established above, groundless litigation satisfies the improper means 
component of an interference claim. See Leigh Furniture v. horn and St. Benedict's 
Development. Therefore, to defeat summary judgment, Mountain West was only 
required to raise issues of fact regarding the validity of the underlying Lawsuit. 
In the underlying Lawsuit, HCU sought relief based on four separate causes of 
action against SDCH; (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Restrictive Covenant on the Use of Land, and (4) 
Declaratory Judgment (the "Lawsuit"). The first, second and fourth claims were 
dismissed in the underlying lawsuit by the trial court on summary judgment. The 
restrictive covenant claim survived based on perceived questions of fact. 
In this case, Mountain West conclusively addressed those perceived issues of fact, 
and established that the restrictive covenant claim was groundless as well. HCU claimed 
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a restrictive covenant prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest Properties) from constructing 
the Medical Center. By its terms, however, the restrictive covenant was limited to a 
prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. A 
commercial ancillary facility is defined as including, but not limited to, 
commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging, physical therapy, 
pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient medical facilities or birthing 
centers, any of which are offered on a commercial basis to third-party users. 
This prohibition shall not restrict physicians on the land from maintaining 
or performing ancillary services for their own patients. This prohibition 
shall be a covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as 
Hospital Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Inc-
the hospital company continues to operate an acute care hospital adjacent to 
the property. 
(R. at 385.) 
Through the affidavit testimony of Richard Vincent and Gordon Bennett (the CEO 
of SDCH), Mountain West established that the planned Medical Center would not have 
been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the restrictive covenant. (R. at 409-
410.) Rather, the Medical Center was simply a 47,000 square foot medical office 
complex. Mountainwest Properties never intended to operate any facilities on the 
Medical Center. Instead, it intended to lease space to tenants. Likewise, the Surgical 
Center that Mountain West Surgical intended to open in leased space within the Medical 
Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the restrictive 
covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not intend to allow any of its member doctors to 
provide the prohibited services on a commercial basis to uthird-party users." The 
member doctors could only perform services on their own patients. (R. at 409-410.) 
These were the only facts before the trial court on summary judgment, and they 
were not disputed. At a bare minimum, Mountain West created issues of fact precluding 
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summary judgment. Under no circumstances, however, did it fail to present evidence to 
support the elements of its interference claim. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT USED MOUNTAIN WEST'S 
FAILURE TO MEET DISCOVERY DEADLINES AS A BASIS FOR GRANTING 
HCU'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
In addition to summary judgment motions, there were several other issues before 
the trial court at the January 20, 2006 hearing. The Court also considered Mountain 
West's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order (R. at 444-445), HCU's Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Richard Vincent (R. at 338) and HCU's Rule 56(f) motion (R. at 479-
480). The heart of these motions was HCU's contention that Mountain West failed to 
comply with the scheduling order. Through Mountain West's motion to amend, and 
HCU's Rule 56(f) motion, the parties both asked the trial court for addition time to 
conduct limited discovery. As an alternative, HCU asked the trial court to punish 
Mountain West for alleged violation of the scheduling order by striking the Affidavit of 
Richard Vincent. HCU did not ask the Court, however, to use the discovery dispute as a 
basis to grant or deny summary judgment. 
The trial court denied Mountain West's motion to amend and denied HCU's 
motion to strike the affidavit of Richard Vincent. It did not rule on HCU's rule 56(f) 
motion, which was essentially rendered moot by its decision on HCU's motion for 
summary judgment. (See Order included in Tab A of the Addendum.) It did not strike any 
of the pleadings. 
On its own initiative, the trial court used the scheduling dispute as a basis to 
decide the summary judgment motions. Despite the fact that HCU never asked it to do 
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so, the trial court ruled that, uAs an additional basis for the Court's decision on 
Defendant's Motion is Plaintiffs failure to comply with the agreed schedule on the 
Attorney's Planning Meeting Report filed herein." (See Addendum, Tab A.) The trial 
court did not identify which of defendant's motions it was referring to, and did not 
identify the rationale for its decision. 
Assuming the trial court was referring to defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, there are two glaring problems with the trial court's ruling. First, any 
perceived violations of the scheduling order did not impact the facts or issues before the 
trial court on summary judgment. Second, even if the Mountain West failed to comply 
with the discovery order, Utah law does not allow the trial court to use that failure as a 
basis to grant HCU's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A. Discovery issues had no bearing on the facts or issues before the court. 
The trial court found that Mountain West failed to file Rule 26 disclosures, failed 
to timely respond to discovery and did not file expert reports. (See Order included in Tab 
A of the Addendum.) Even if the trial court was correct, none of these acts had any 
bearing on the issues before the trial court. Mountain West ultimately responded to 
written discovery, and included all of the information typically contained in Rule 26 
disclosures. While the discovery responses were admittedly late, the trial court never 
granted a motion to compel or had to address any issues relating to discovery in this case. 
The trial court's reference to expert reports is also troubling. Mountain West's 
abuse of process and tortuous interference claims do not rely on expert testimony. 
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Consequently, it is irrelevant whether Mountain West designated expert witnesses by the 
deadline contained it the scheduling order. 
Simply put, the alleged violation of the scheduling order should have had no 
bearing on the legal or factual issues before the trial court. 
B. There is no legal basis for the trial court's decision. 
There was no pattern of discovery abuse in this case. The trial court never 
considered a motion to compel, and prior to its final order, never entered any ruling 
regarding discovery. Those facts highlight the egregious nature of the trial court's 
decision. 
There is also no precedent for the trial court's decision. While this Court has 
upheld a trial court's decision to strike pleadings when a party repeatedly violates orders 
compelling discovery, Mountain West is not aware of single case where a Utah Appellate 
court has upheld (or even addressed) a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment 
based on alleged failures to timely comply with a scheduling order. This fact was readily 
acknowledged by the by the trial court at the hearing. (R. at 530, page 57 lines 4-14.) 
Because it lacked any legal basis for its actions, the trial court's decision must be 
overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mountain West respectfully requests that this Court (1) 
vacate the trial court's decisions on summary judgment, enter summary judgment for 
Mountain West on its abuse of process claim and remand the case to the trial court for a 
determination regarding the amount of damages suffered by Mountain West; or in the 
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alternative, Mountain West requests that the Court vacate the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling on the abuse of process claim and remand the case to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits; and (2) Mountain West requests that the Court vacate the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling on the tortious interference claim and remand the case to the 
trial court for a trial on the merits . 
DATED this 28th day of July, 2006. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Craig Q/Adrfmson 
Craig A. Hog^an-
Debra G. Griffiths 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Tab A 
Andrew H. Stone (USB # 4921) 
Marci B. Rechtenbach (USB #8146) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 ^ P 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 j f ^ n # 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 V ^ »• ^ 
Attorneys for Defendant ^ v* 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL CENTER, : ORDER 
L.L.C. and MOUNTAINWEST MEDICAL 
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, dba 
LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 040600019 MI 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This case come on before the Court on January 20,2006 on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to 
Strike Affidavit of Richard Vincent and Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. The 
Court, have reviewed the memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties, and having considered 
the arguments of counsel, makes the following ruling: 
1. The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
all counts; 
2. With respect to Plaintiffs' interference claim, the Court rules that as a matter of 
law neither the underlying lawsuit in the matter of Hospital Corporation of Utah v. South Davis 
728499v2 
Community Hospital, Case 000700012 (2nd D. Court, Judge Allphin) or the lis pendens filed by 
Defendant herein in connection with that other action can form the basis for an interference 
action for the reasons stated in Defendant's brief. Plaintiffs have failed to factually demonstrate 
the elements of an interference claim and the conduct alleged to constitute an interference is 
privileged as a matter of law; 
3. On Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of process, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed 
to produce evidence of an ulterior motive on the part of Defendant or a willful act not proper in the 
regular course proceedings that caused Plaintiffs' harm. The Court rules that as a matter of law that the 
lis pendens filed by Defendant herein in connection with that other action cannot form the basis for an 
abuse of process claim for the reasons stated in Defendant's brief. In addition, Plaintiffs offer no 
testimony from any lender or title company that the lis pendens, as such, caused them to refuse to 
proceed with the sale of the underlying land; 
4. In short, Plaintiffs have not come forth with evidence to create any disputed issue of fact 
and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; 
5. An additional basis for the Court's decision on Defendant's Motion is Plaintiffs failure 
to comply with the agreed schedule on the Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report filed herein. This 
includes the failure of the Plaintiffs to file Rule 26 Disclosures, to respond to discovery during the 
factual discovery period, and file expert reports on the appointed date; 
6. As to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent, the Court DENIES 
this motion and this Court has granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment notwithstanding such 
affidavit; 
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7. As to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court DENIES that motion 
for the reasons stated above for the Court's granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The 
Court rules that as a matter of law that the lis pendens filed by Defendant herein in connection with that 
other action cannot form the basis for an abuse of process claim for the reasons stated in Defendant's 
brief; and 
8. As to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, the Court DENIES that motion 
as set forth above on its ruling for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this < b^dky of February, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Thomas Ly 
Second District < Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Cranio. Adamson 
Crdfg A. Hoggan 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on c/ day of February, 2006,1 caused one true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Craig G. Adamson 
Craig A. Hoggan 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street, Ste. 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FARM1NGTON DEPARTMENT 
o r -
— 1 ^ 
-C~ c: 
en 
—O ^ O 
CD 
Cm) 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, dba 
LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOUTH DAVIS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF US PENDENS 
Civil No. 000700012 
Judge Allphin 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 
Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview Hospital ("Lakeview"), the above-named 
plaintiff, has a pending Complaint against the above-named defendant South Davis Community 
Hospital, Inc. ("South Davis") in the above-entiled Court for injunctive relief against South 
Davis's proposed use o\" certain real property owned by South Davis, which is located in 
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Bountiful, Utah, and is more particularly described as the following described tracts of land in 
Davis County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL 1: 
Beginning on the North line of Section 29 and a Westerly deed segment of the 
Hospital Corporation at point North 89°38'33" East 302.48 feet along the 
section line from the Northwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range 
1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Bountiful, Utah; and running thence 
North 0°12'10" West 170.00 feet, thence North 89°38'33" East 2.28 feet to a 
point in a Southerly fence line in connection with the Barton Creek drainage 
channel, and a point on a 75 foot radius curve to the right (radius bears South 
17°17'50" West); thence Southeasterly along said curve and fence line 29.06 
feet (central angle = 22°12'08" and next point is non-tangent); thence South 
52°36' East 8.87 feet to a point on a 98 foot radius curve to the right (radius 
bears South 38°01'40" West); thence Southeasterly along said curve for an arc 
distance of 19.70 feet feet (central angle = ll°31'08" and next point is non-
tangent), thence South 42°54'13"East 19.87 feet, thence South 53°31'02" East 
8.44 feet, thence South 49°42' East 17.47 feet, thence South 54°33'48" East 
17.75 feet; thence South 52°06'24" East 56.36 feet, thence North 41°21'30" 
East 5.05 feet, thence South 55°44'56" East 15.77 feet to a point on a 66.6 foot 
radius curve to the right (radius bears South 31 °34'13" West) thence 
Southeasterly along said curve for an arc distance of of 37.51 feet (central angle 
= 32° 15'54" and next point is non-tangent), thence South 20° 19'46" East 4.44 
feet; thence North 89°40'49" West 51.47 feet, thence South 10°15'50" West 
24.69 feet to said section line, thence South 89°38'33" West 127.82 feet along 
the section line to point of beginning. 
Parcel #04-003-0-10^ Orjaq 
PARCEL 2; 
Beginning on North line of 5Ul South Street 258.92 feet East line of 4* East 
Street at a point 359.88 feet East and 483.86 feet South 0°07' West of relocated 
NW corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East Salt Lake Meridian; 
thence North 0°07' East 236.5 feet; thence East 110 feet; thence South 0°7' 
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West 236.5 feet to North line of 5th South Street; thence West 100 feet to the 
point of beginning. Cont. 0.595 acres. 
Parcel #04-069-0004. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning on North side of 5th South Street 368.92 feet East of East line of 4Ul 
East Street, which point is 469.88 feet East and 438.86 feet South 0°07' West 
of relocated monument at NW corner Section 29 Township 2 North, Range 1 
East; Salt Lake Meridian; North 0°07' East 236.5 feet East 84.5 feet South 
0°07' West 236.5 feet to North line side of 5th South Street, thence West along 
side of North line 84.5 feet to beginning. Cont. 0.46 acres. 
Parcel #65-069-0005. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point on the North line of 500 South Street (a 66 foot wide road) 
which point is North 89°38'33" East 100.96 feet along the Section line and 
South 0° 11 '23" East 483.76 feet along the East line of 400 East Street (a 66 
foot wide road) and North 89°44'04" East 258.92 feet along said North line of 
500 South Street from the Northwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point of beginning being also 
North 89°44'04" East 291.92 feet along the centerline of said 500 South Street 
and North 0°11'23" West 33.00 feet from an existing brass monument at the 
centerline intersection of said 400 East Street and said 500 South Street and 
running thence North 0°H'23" West 236.50 feet along an existing fence line; 
thence North 89°44'04" East 26.08 feet; thence North 0°11'23" West 117.47 
feet along a line which is 10 feet east of an existing hospital building; thence 
North 89°38'33" East 135.02 feet; thence along an existing fence on the West 
boundary of the Barton Creek Canal in the following two courses: Southeasterly 
56.49 feet along the arc of a 330.00 foot radius curve to the left through a 
central angle of 9°48'31" (chord bears South 20°30'00" East 67.43 feet), South 
20°30'00" East 67.43 feet; thence South 89°44'04" West 89.49 feet; thence 
South 0°11'23" East 236.50 feet; thence South 89°44'04" West 110.00 feet 
along said North line of 500 South Street to the point of beginning. 
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DATED this i l _ day of March 2000 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
^ nM1 --
James S. Lowne 
Lewis M. Francis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH {
 ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the £ ± day of March, 2000, personally appeared before me Lewis M. Francis, 
t h e signer of the foregoing instrument, who du,y acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
^ - - r - ^ MOTMRY PUBUC 
&^p%\ DEPQIt AShTON 
*&£& **\ 170 South Man * 1 500 
; * 2 Q $ W Salt Lake City UT B4101 
^ £ i $ -7 My Conmission Expires 
KZ y-y Aon! 14 2032 
V ^ i i i V STATS. ^ F UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ ^ t i a y of March, 2000, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Lis Pendens, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Defendant 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
\^^\AQtAtK3 
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Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Craig A. Hoggan (8202) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Facsimile: (801)355-2513 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN II I)', ShU >Ni) II ii HCIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN WEST SURGICAL : 
CENTER, L.L.C. and : 
MOUNTAINWEST MED1 .. : AFF *AVTI OF RICHARD 
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., : VINCENT 
Plaintiffs, 
. C I M - M i i inmDri i 
vs. : 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, '. Judge Thomas L. Kay 
dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah '. 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
-oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
CONN IV OF SALT LAKE ) 
Richard Vincent, briny, f'irsi duly sworn iindri oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I I am an individual over the age of eighteen and I make the following Affidavit based 
on my personal knowledge, and w< 
2. In 1999 and 2000,1 was the Secretary/Treasurer of Mountain West Surgical Center 
L.L.C. (Mountain West Surgical") and the Secretary/Treasurer of Mountainwest Medical 
Properties L.L.C. ("Mountainwest Properties"). 
3. In 1999, Mountainwest Properties organized a joint venture for the construction and 
operation of a 47,000 square foot medical office building to be constructed on the property of 
South Davis Community Hospital which is adjacent to Lakeview Hospital ("the Medical 
Center"). 
4. 16,000 of the 47,000 square feet was to be leased to Mountain West Surgical for the 
operation of a surgical center (the "Surgical Center"). The remaining space in the Medical 
Center was to be leased as office space to doctors who were members of Mountainwest 
Properties. 
5. Mountainwest Properties planned to construct the Medical Center on property that was 
owned by South Davis Community Hospital ("SDCH"). 
6. SDCH was to contribute a portion of its property to Mountainwest Properties in 
exchange for a membership interest in Mountain West Properties. 
7. SDCH did not have, and was never going to have, a membership interest in Mountain 
West Surgical. 
8. Throughout 1999, Mountainwest Properties had worked towards the construction of 
the Medical Center. It had obtained approval from Bountiful City to construct the Medical 
Center, it had paid architects and engineers hundreds of thousands of dollars to prepare final 
plans and specifications for the construction of the Medical Center and had made arrangements 
and received commitments for construction financing and long term financing for the Medical 
Center. 
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(), III 11 had actively opposed the construction of the Medical Center. For example, it 
openly opposed Mountainwest Properties efforts to obtain development appn -\:<: 
i Viilei" from lUtiititikil \ 
10. By March of 2000, Mountainwest Properties had obtained a final commitment from 
its construe)inn u n<l< fid'*') iction on the Medical Center during the first 
week of March. 
11. Days before SDCH -Properties, and 
construction could begin on the Medical Center, HCU filed a notice of lis pendens in the office 
of the Davis County Recorder on March 2,2000. 
] ,l I I'IL Its (Kiiilcn i was discovered by Mountainwest Properties when its lender pulled a 
final title report as it was preparing to fund Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. 
1 ; the projet - *< 11 did not deed the 
property to Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest Properties' lender withdrew its 
commitment for construction financing. 
1 irough the lawsuit and subsequent lis pendens, HCU claimed that there was a 
restrictive covenant that prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest Properties) 11 m 11 • • i 11 111 u I. i.
 f 11 .t 
Medic ni CeniH' 
15. By its terms, the restrictive covenant was a: 
Prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. A commercial 
ancillary facility is defined as including but not limited to commercial laboratories or 
x-ray, radiological imaging, physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or 
out-patient Medical facilities or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a 
commercial basis to third-party users. This prohibition shall not restrict physicians 
on the land from maintaining or performing ancillary services for their own patients. 
This prohibition shall be a covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as 
Hospital Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Inc.- the hospital 
company continues to operate an acute care hospital adjacent to the property 
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16. The planned Medical Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" 
as defined by the restrictive covenant. Rather, the Medical Center was simply a 47,000 square 
foot medical office complex. 
17. Mountainwest Properties did not intend to operate any facilities on the Medical 
Center. Instead, it intended to lease space to tenants. 
18. The Surgical Center that Mountain West Surgical intended to open in leased space 
within the Medical Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by 
the restrictive covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not intend to allow any of its member 
doctors to provide the prohibited services on a commercial basis to "third-party users". The 
member doctors could only perform services on their own patients. 
19. Following the filing of the lawsuit and recording of the lis pendens, it became clear 
that the HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with the construction of the Medical Center. 
Following the filing of the lawsuit and recording of the lis pendens, I had a conversation with 
Lynn Summerhays, a member of Lakeview Hospital's board. Mr. Summerhays informed me 
that the lawsuit and lis pendens were just the first in a series of actions that HCU intended to take 
to stop construction of the Medical Center. He told me that HCU would do whatever was 
necessary tie up the process and delay construction of the Medical Center at the SDCH location. 
DATED th i s /H^W of October, 2005. 
Richard Vincent 
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this t^Z day of October, 2005. 
ROBYN LAMBERT 
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH 
8 EAST BROADWAY, STE 740 
SALT LAKE CTTY, UT 84111 
MyComm. Exp, 08/21/2006 
Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the I«•/**" day of October, 2005, I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregon 
Andrew H. Stone 
Marci B. Rechtenbach 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & M 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
JGH 
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HCGHD DISTRICT COURT 
M M 28 P I: 2b 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, 
dba LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOUTH DAVIS COMMUNITY 
HOSPITAL mr » TTtah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND 
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CI AIM 
Case No. 000700012 
Judge Michael i i Al'mliiii 
INTRODUCTION 
South Davis Comniuiiih llnsmlril In '), defendant, has filed this Motion for 
Summary Judgment, with a memorandum in support of the motion 
ci > i I I | >iy uitli I he requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administr .atement of undisputed facts in 
"separate numbered sentences which specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
!ll».' t'.!',",:'.!!! t'.'llf'K ' 
The Plaintiff, Hospital Corporation of Utah, 
memorandum. In that memorandum HCU, unlike SDCH, included a separate statement of 
undisputed facts in Nt'p.iiiiir numlvi nl ,ciih noes specifically referring to those portions of the 
record upon which it relied. 
As a result of having only one party follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-
501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Court made its own determination as to 
what facts are in dispute and which of these facts are material for the purpose of this motion. In 
so doing, the Court compared HCU's numbered statement of undisputed facts with both the 
unformatted facts listed in SDCH's brief, as well as SDCH's Answer. Based on this comparison, 
the Court concludes the following: 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Up until approximately 1973, SDCH operated a small 74 bed general acute care 
hospital at the site of its current nursing home facility in Bountiful, Utah. 
2. By the mid-1960's, both Davis County and SDCH recognized that its hospital facility 
was neither large enough nor modern enough to meet the growing demands of southern Davis 
County residents. Davis County determined that it needed two new hospitals to serve its growing 
population, with one hospital in the north end of the county, and another in the south. 
3. SDCH recognized that it could not remodel or enlarge the SDCH facility sufficiently to 
meet the growing needs of southern Davis County, and that it did not have the resources to 
construct and operate a new hospital. 
4. Davis County eventually sought commercial entities to develop, finance, construct and 
operate the new Davis County hospitals. After lengthy investigation and extended negotiations 
with Davis County and SDCH, Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA") agreed to develop, 
finance, construct and operate a new and larger hospital, now known as Lakeview Hospital, on 
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the property adjoining the old SDCH hospital, As a result, on or about November 20, 1973, 
SDCH and HCA entered into a written agreement ("Agreement"). 
5. Pursuant to the Agreement, HCA agreed to finance, develop, construct, and operate 
the Lakeview Hospital, through Hospital Corpc a subsidiary of HCA. 
HCU promised to keep prices at or below the average prices for substantially simiL * 
Hoh -Day Saint hospitals for a period of four years. 
6. SDCH agreed to cease operating its present tttif'tilx»i nig "M hcd general acute care 
hospital at the time HCA became ready and able to commence its operation of a new, modern, 
149 (approximati lyf linl ).»ni< i.il iuiilf
 kau' lui\fii(„il 
The Agreement did not impose any other restrictions on. SD( ilh re .^u Is (o 
ipeting with i: 
8. Both HCU and SDCH co • . . - . Lakeview Hospital 
and SDCH have not provided overlapping services. Lakeview Hospital has continn. 
.I .i ucniM.il .i ili i i Iiii'.pn.il .il nl SIM 11 has continued operating its neighboring facility as a 
nursing home. 
11 lnl 989 Lakeview transferred deeds to SDCH in order to straighten the borders 
between their adjoining deeds were certain covenants prohibiting 
the establishment of a competing commercial ancillary facility. The pertinent 
nercial ancillary facility as: 
including but not limited to commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging, 
physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient Medical facilities 
or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a commercial basis to third party 
users. This prohibition shall not restrict physicians on the land from maintaining or 
performing ancillary services for their own patients. 
10. SDCH is now developing, with other partners, a 47,000 square foot medical facility 
on the property adjoining Lakeview Hospital, including a 16,000 square foot out-patient surgical 
center (the "Medical Center"). 
11. The Medical Center will perform functions currently being performed by Lakeview 
Hospital, including those traditionally performed by general acute care hospitals, such as 
Lakeview. SDCH is providing the land for the Medical Center, will be a tenant, and will share in 
the profits from it. 
12. On March 2, 2000, HCU filed a Notice of Lis Pendens, which was recorded in the 
office of the Davis County Recorder. 
It is unclear from either party which parcels of land contain restrictive covenants. In 
addition, it is also unclear which parcels of land HCU named in it's Notice of Lis Pendens. 
Finally, the exact location of the proposed development on the various parcels has not been 
provided to the Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doit, Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co., 
926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996); see also Bevnon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743. 854 P.2d 
513, 514-515 (Utah 1993); and Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 
1993). 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the evidence in "a 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hunt. 785 P.2d 414, 415 
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(Utah 1990). However, summary judgment is appropriate even on factual issues where the 
evidence is such that reasonable persons could not disagree. Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 
439 (Utah 1996). 
Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis 1* n »>pp< isuiw suiiifiiai / 
judgment. See Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). When a motion for summary 
judgment is filed and supported oi affidavits (CM other material allowed as evidence 
in such cases), the party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affida 
other « ~ of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See D&L Supply v. 
Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thavne v. Beneficial. L'Liii int, h ' " f > ( i i<"»11"(jfi 1994). . 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
If i«; tti M| iili»,(!iii!n! VIH ilit f Kin II i , (|| need to use one or more of the properties 
containing a non-competition covenant as parking for the Medico itn MC'll conlciuls lluit • 
^ 1)(1" , vil1 iHi'd r use, either directly or indirectly, one or more of the restricted properties in 
such a manner. SDCH claims that none of the parcels containing restrictive covenants will be 
used in a manner inconsistent with the restrictive covenant. The use of the said parcels cniil.iininn 
the i estric ly a material issue of fact, which precludes summary judgment. 
This is true because the Utah Supreme Court has opined that llir rffivin ilui.ninn mil a restrictive 
i:< i iiiiiiii when a duration is not expressed, is a reasonable time. To determine what a reasonable 
time is in a given case, the Coin t mi ist considei the cii ciimstances surrounding the inclusion of the 
restrictive covenant in the deed, as well as the purpose of its imposition. Metiupulitan inv. i"u ..v. 
SjJI^ . ' ^ J1 'cl'Hii »i |lnai M'O.-I I his is a factually sensitive analysis that must be 
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undertaken at trial. Thus, if the proposed treatment facility or any of its appurtenant parking lots 
ildpfiatfidjon^ffliof the restricted deeds, it is possible that the restrictive covenant is still valid and 
binding. This cannot be determined on the facts presently before the Court. 
There is also a factual issue as to whether the Medical Center will be used for commercial 
purposes to third party users, or if it will be used merely for physicians' existing patients. HCU 
contends that the Medical Center will provide acute medical treatment on a commercial basis to 
third party users. SDCH, on the other hand, contends the Medical Center will be used by 
physicians to treat their existing patients. It is unclear what constitutes an "existing patient" for 
the purposes of this restrictive covenant. This fact is also clearly material. If SDCH intends to 
use the facility for physicians' existing patients, as opposed to newly acquired patients, then 
-SDCH is not in violation of the restrictive covenant, even if the treatment facility or its 
appurtenant parking lots will be located on the restricted parcels. 
Given the fact that there are at least two genuine issues of material fact, the Court finds 
that summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. However, the Court finds that partial 
summary judgment may be appropriate on certain issues, to be discussed below. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As a matter of law, this Court concludes the Agreement between HCA and SDCH did not 
impose an obligation on SDCH to refrain from competing with HCA for an indefinite period of 
time. The plain wording of the Agreement places only one restriction on SDCH with respect to 
not competing with HCU: to cease operating its present 74-bed general acute care hospital. It is 
undisputed that SDCH met this obligation. The unambiguous wording of the contract imposes no 
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other restrictions on SDCH. Thus, this Court finds that SDCH has fulfilled its obligation under 
the Agreement, and the SDCH is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of an express 
ciifili.nliiiil ih\h (ii iiiiii " ill* Agreement. . .--v. • 
'• The Court next addresses the issue of whether then-wdh .in ininlii.'i.l m VHWIIIII IUI Sin il 
not to compete with HCA for an indefinite period of time with respect to operating an general 
acute medical facili* , . . Pro Image. Inc.. lJ.2d 48 (1999), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that it is improper for a court to look beyond lln ln.ni of I lit- MH H;IU iniilcss 
it is unclear or ambiguous. If a contract is ambiguous or unclear on its face, extrinsic evidence is 
appropriate to determine the intent" ,ourt must first determine 
whether the contract was unclear or ambiguous. 
I Ii i s i 1111 1 111111 111.11 11 ic Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. The Agreement 
binds SDCH to only one relevant obligation: * re hospital The 
Agreement is silent with respect to any other non-competition restrictions. Silence, however, is 
not ambiguity uafted by attorneys for the benefit of a client fully 
encompass the client's intentions. In addition, the Court will constaii a\i\ « unli;,n;1 uumisl Ihe 
it in the present case, HCU drafted the Agreement and had the opportunity to 
enumerate additional conditions and oMi^aiioni t W m Thus, because the Agreement 
is clear on its face, it is inappropriate for the Court to speculate as to what the parties' intent 
were by entertaining extrinsic evidence SDCH is entitled to summary judgment as to the 
existence of any implied contractual right. 
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Furthermore, even if extrinsic evidence were allowed and the Court found there was an 
implied covenant restricting SDCH from constructing and operating a general acute facility, this 
Court finds that such a restrictive covenant would be overly broad. The four requirements for a 
valid restrictive covenant are that: (1) the covenant not to compete must be supported by 
consideration; (2) no bad faith may be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the covenant 
must be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business; and (4) the covenant must be 
reasonable in its restrictions in terms of time and geographic area. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 
120 Utah 2d 608, 619, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (1951). 
In the present case, there is ample evidence SDCH and HC A mutually exchanged 
promises and obligations, thus satisfying the consideration element. There are no allegations that 
either HCA or SDCH had bad faith in negotiating their Agreement, so the Court will presume 
good faith. Since HCA explicitly required SDCH to shut down its current facility, the Court 
further infers that HCA sought the goodwill created by SDCH. In addition, since neither party 
has raised the issue of geographic area, the only remaining issue is whether this implied covenant 
is reasonable with respect to it's duration. 
In Allen, supra., the Court held, "restrictive covenants are generally upheld by the courts 
where they are necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of which the covenant 
was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such 
protection. See also 9 A.L.R. 1456, 20 A.L.R 861, 67 A.L.R 1002, 98 A.L.R. 963, and 155 
A.L.R. 652 This is consistent with Restatement of Contracts. Second § 188d: 
The extent of the restraint is a critical factor in determining its reasonableness.... If 
the promise proscribes types of activity more extensive than necessary to protect 
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those engaged lnTby the promisee, it goes beyond what is necessary to protect his 
legitimate interests and is unreasonable. 
In the present case, HCU had an interest in requiring SDCH shut down its present general 
acute facilit ! \ • i The Court presumes HCU's purpose in so doing 
was to avoid having to compete with the predominant general a i 
1 ia v i s i ( H nil) J • •>;' • n return, HCU obliged itself to keep its prices in check for four years. The 
Court presumes HCU's obligati nat the hospital would not 
unduly burden it with rapidly increasing rates to cover its costs of the new Lake view Hospital it 
v is convinced that HCU would not have imposed on it a restriction to 
not raise its prices for four years if it did not think mount of time, while it 
may be true that a covenant not to compete for four years may be necessary to protect HCU's 
interest in establishing iKdf n*. SIM "11 \
 t vplacement, • • - .ourt finds that a 27 year restriction is 
overly broad, and thus is invalid as a matter of law. 
LIS PENDENS AS AN UNLAWFUL LIEN 
The Court now addresses whether HH I unl i fi'P'v |iLn:rd a wrongful lien on SDCH's 
property when it filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the office of the Davis Count H * 
clearly established - lien on the owner's interest in real property. A 
lien discourages potential purchasers since the land is use*' udgment i 11 I he 
renders an unfavorable judgment against the landowner. 
SDCH contends that HCt J filed a w« ont'tii'l lien against it in filing its Notice of Lis 
Pendens, Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1(6) defines "wrongful lien" as: 
Any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's 
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) 
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expressly Buthurizedisythirehap^ 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the real property. 
The applicable section at issue is subsection (a), which requires that the Lis Pendens has to be 
authorized by statute. The only pertinent statute dealing with the Lis Pendens is Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 78-40-1 and 2. These sections authorize the filing of a Lis Pendens "in actions that 
affect title to and/or the right to possession of land." Thus, the party that files the Lis Pendens 
must have a legal property interest in the parcels listed in the Notice. 
HCU contends that the current Utah Wrongful Lien statute specifically excludes the filing 
of a Lis Pendens from its coverage. This presupposes that the Lis Pendens was properly filed. 
As support for its proposition that its filing a Notice of Lis Pendens was properly filed, and thus 
not wrongful, HCU cites Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Ut. 1976). HCU asserts Hansen 
establishes the proposition that filing a Notice of Lis Pendens is not wrongful when the underlying 
lawsuit affects the use of, as opposed to affecting the title to or possession of, certain land. 
Although Hansen indeed addresses when a Notice of Lis Pendens is improper, this Court 
finds that HCU's asserted proposition is nowhere in the body of the opinion. The plain wording 
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-40-1 and 2 requires that the action has to affect title to and/or the 
right to possession of land. HCU has not alleged any right to title to any of the parcels described 
in the Notice of Lis Pendens. Neither has HCU alleged any right to possession of these said 
parcels. 
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Even if HCU had a legitimate property interest in one of the parcels listed in the Notice, 
J It I) tailed lo specifically state in its Complaint any property interest or right to any of the said 
parcels. In Winters v. Schulman. 199^ * >*•.>••- \ ~ r " 9 9 9 ) , t h e 
Utah Court of Appeals held that the Lis Pendens was invalid because the ( 
fitihi' In iitliiuv,'- iiiii" m or possession of the property as required under § 78-40-2. {See comment 
8, paragraph 2). The United States Supreme Coi II t has also 'held that the opening pleadings of a 
party who intends to rely on operation of the doctrine of Lis Pendens with respect to property 
involved elude an adequate description of the property through information 
displayed in the pleadings. See Miller v. Sherry, - HUN t co if 
I It 'U had a legitimate property interest, it failed to adequately describe in its Complaint both this 
interest and the particula- . .- * - i an interest. Therefore, the Court finds 
that HCU's Notice of Lis Pendens was improperly filed, and thus is a wrongful (HI 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
SDCH has moved the Court for tanr it i file jm -unuklcd -iiiswer and counterclaim. 
SI >CH cannot file the amended answer and counterclaim without leave of the court, I low ;^  rr, 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires." In this case SDCH filed its answer o; j mt . is 
Pendens discussed above on March 2, 2000, approximately 1 1/2 months after SDCH filed its 
answer. The Lis Pendens is one ( )CH's proposed amended 
answer and counterclaim. The Court concludes that the interests of justic 
allowing SDCI11 « lilr flic umended answer and counterclaim, and leave is hereby granted. 
KULING 
Based on the foregoing, the Court rules that SDCH's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Furthermore, SDCH is given leave to file its 
amended answer and counterclaim. Counsel for SDCH is directed to prepare an order in 
accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
2£-Dated June 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on June 
^?2^—; 2000, postage prepaid, to the following: 
George K.Fadel #1021 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
James S. Lowrie (USB #2007) 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael S. Edwards 
Law Clerk to the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
13 
